The Somalia affair began with a brutal murder committed by members of the Canadian Airborne Regiment and has evolved into a disgraceful exercise in denial and deceit all the way up the chain of command. The resulting inquiry has established that the problems of discipline and leadership that surfaced in Somalia were by no means confined to a few misfits in the Airborne Regiment, but are symptoms of a much wider malaise in the Canadian military. The crisis of confidence in Canada’s armed forces, these two books argue, has been building for many years and stems directly from the failure of military leadership and professionalism at the highest levels of command.

In Significant Incident, University of Calgary professor David Bercuson takes the incidents in Somalia during March of 1993 as the starting point for a discussion of the present state of Canada’s army. Noting, quite correctly, that Canadians (including the media) knew next to nothing of their country’s military history and its army, he reviews the changes to the armed forces and the command structure since the end of the Second World War, with emphasis on the intrusion of civil bureaucracy into military decision-making since the late 1960s. This process saw the principles of military policy and leadership sacrificed to managerial techniques and careerism wholly unsuited to maintaining an effective professional army. The result is an overly bureaucratized, top-heavy army in which “it is the managerial, ass-covering, political skills that lead to promotion,” a verdict that the testimony presented to the Somalia inquiry does nothing to refute.

Bercuson writes with sympathy and insight about the life and conditions of soldiers, the vast majority of whom perform their duties well despite chronic shortages and outdated equipment, and his chapter on the Bosnia mission pays homage to the courage and resilience of Canadian soldiers in exceptionally trying circumstances. He presents a critical but balanced assessment of Canada’s army, and puts its current problems in a context that is all too often lacking. His book is both timely and incisive.

The authors of Tarnished Brass, journalist Brian Nolan and ex-serviceman Scott Taylor, also take the view that the armed forces have been badly served by the civil and military bureaucrats running the show at National Defence Headquarters. They present a litany of greed, incompetence, and favouritism depressingly similar to Stevie Cameron’s On the Take, targeting individuals whose antics have cost taxpayers tidy sums and erased the rank and file’s confidence in its leadership. The roll call begins with former deputy minister Robert Fowler and former chief of defence staff John de Chastelain, who get a chapter each; the influence peddling, careerism, and wastefulness of other NDHQ apparatchiks fill successive chapters. Although the authors’ complaints at times seem excessive, their essential point holds true. The men at the very top have betrayed the core principle of military leadership, which calls upon officers to place the welfare of their men above all other considerations. It is infuriating to read of the lavish salaries, perks, and pensions available to the upper echelons when Canadian soldiers risking their lives on active service lack basic equipment and supplies.

The final chapter of Tarnished Brass suggests reforms to correct the flaws revealed by the Somalia affair and the problems created by a bloated, bureaucratized command structure. Whether they accept these suggestions or not, it is to be hoped that the military axiom cited in both books, “there are no bad soldiers, only bad officers,” will be taken to heart by the generals and administrators who have no one but themselves to blame for the public’s loss of confidence in a once proud Canadian institution.